

Mainstreaming Religious Moderation in Facing the Shift of Terrorism Movement Patterns in Indonesia

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Abstract: This article discusses the role of religious moderation in dealing with the changing pattern of terrorism movements in Indonesia. Terrorism, which has been a serious threat since the 2002 Bali bombings, continues to evolve with increasingly complex movement patterns. The Government of Indonesia has taken steps to address it, including implementing the Terrorism Law, but challenges remain, especially regarding the often subjective definition of terrorism. This article aims to answer the question: How can religious moderation effectively deal with terrorism in Indonesia? This study uses qualitative methods and content analysis to analyze the synergy between the government and civil society, especially faith-based organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, in building community resilience against extremist ideologies. The study's findings suggest that the religious moderation approach, which involves cooperation between religious leaders and the government, can reduce the escalation of terrorism through a soft-power approach. The main scholarly contribution of this article is the emphasis on the importance of a more effective and sustainable approach to religious moderation in handling terrorism, as well as the need for synergy between the government and civil society actors in preventing radicalization at the grassroots level.

Keywords: religious moderation, terrorism, Indonesia, civil society, radicalism

1. Introduction

Terrorism has become a significant threat in Indonesia, with a series of horrific events marking the country's dark history. The tragedy of the bombing at the Sari Club and Paddy's Discotheque on Jalan Legian Kuta, Bali, on October 12, 2002, became the starting point for global recognition of extremism in Indonesia as a form of terrorism. The attack killed 202 people and caused widespread fear across the state. In the aftermath of these incidents, violence spread through networks of movements or sympathizers in various regions, highlighting the increasingly real and urgent threat (Khamdan, 2015).

This spate of terrorist attacks, including the bombings at the JW Marriot Hotel in Jakarta and several churches in 2000, underscores the urgency of tackling extremism that can lead to terrorism. This growing threat has prompted the government to take special steps by issuing Government Regulation instead of Law (Perppu) Number 1 of 2002, later inaugurated as Law Number 15 of 2023 concerning the Eradication of Terrorism Crimes. However, the often subjective definition of terrorism poses challenges in its application. Terrorism is generally understood as an act that

aims to scare the public and oppose the government, but this understanding often differs from one party to another (Khamdan, 2018).

Amid these challenges, religious moderation has emerged as a potential approach that can help address terrorism. This approach emphasizes the importance of cooperation between the government and religious leaders in promoting an understanding that rejects radicalism. For example, faith-based civil society organizations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, have called for a more humane treatment of terrorism suspects. A soft-power-based approach involving clerics and civil society groups is more effective in building community resilience to extremist ideologies.

This article aims to investigate the role of religious moderation in overcoming the challenges of terrorism in Indonesia. The underlying research question is: How can religious moderation serve as an effective tool in dealing with terrorism in Indonesia? The main argument that will be presented is that religious moderation strategies, through collaboration between religious leaders and the government, can build community resilience to extremism, thereby reducing the incidence of terrorism in Indonesia. By utilizing this approach, it is hoped that a safer and more peaceful environment can be created where people can live without fear and threats from acts of terrorism.

2. Method

This article examines the relationship between civil society synergy and shifting patterns of terrorism in Indonesia. The phenomenon of changing terror targets and the formation of terror network cells is at least influenced by the handling strategies of government officials and civil society. Qualitative methods are used to explain the data found descriptively. This means that the data construction process is understood as the result of interpretations with plural dimensions or depending on the analytical point of view.

This article uses primary sources in the form of documents relating to shifts in the pattern of terrorist movements and synergistic activities between civil society and government officials in handling terrorism in Indonesia. The data processing process is carried out using the content analysis method using the descriptive-analytic method. Content analysis is done by analyzing communication patterns and models and the meaning of several codes, symbols, and content either qualitatively or quantitatively. The research method stages include the process of decomposing data, the process of comparing, the process of grouping and sorting, and the process of linking one data with other data to find conclusions on several research questions. This series of steps is combined through an interpretation stage, allowing several new data to be added to complete or eliminate other data. The social criticism approach is used with an inductive thinking framework while remaining based on the suitability of the results from the triangulation of research data.

3. Finding and Discussion

3.1. Global Terrorism and Shifting Movement Patterns in Indonesia

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon or has existed since the Bali bombings. Terror events have existed since the existence of humans on earth, which have undergone evolution according to their respective levels of civilization. In the Indonesian context, acts of terror against citizens and the legitimate government have been going on since Indonesia's independence. However, the official use of the term terrorism in Indonesia only emerged after the 2002 Bali Bombing tragedy. This was related to the enactment of the Terrorism Law in 2003.

The transformation of terrorism in Indonesia can at least be mapped by movement patterns and periodization based on the Terrorism Law. This also happened on an international scale, where regulations on terrorism were only agreed on November 16, 1937. The international agreement on terrorism as a transnational criminal crime is regulated in the 1937 Geneva Convention, a name for the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism or the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. Terrorism (Mestika, 2023). The global

agreement agreed upon by members of the League of Nations was signed by France, the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, Bulgaria, Spain, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Peru, Estonia, and Venezuela (Dubin, 1993).

Romania proposed the convention to the League of Nations in 1926. The proposal that emerged after World War I positioned the crime of terrorism as a separate crime. This is at least influenced by the fact that in the period of the World War from 28 July 1914 to 11 November 1918, humanitarian tragedies in war were only used as a form of political or war crime. This requires the need to specifically differentiate terror outside of war situations as a crime of terrorism, and every country must make terrorism a special crime. The 1937 Geneva Convention did not operate as international law because the Second World War occurred between 1939-1945. Germany, under Nazi rule, built a military alliance with Italy and Japan and carried out invasions of several countries. Germany's alliance steps faced France, England, and the Netherlands, along with colonial colonies worldwide.

3.2. Global Jihad and Theological Solidarity

Acts of violence carried out by several countries influence acts of terror carried out individually and in communities. Ottoman Turkey's involvement in the German-Austrian-Italian Triple Alliance coalition in World War I experienced defeat by the Anglo-French-Russian Triple Entente Alliance. Consequently, Palestine, which used to be part of the Levantine Province under the Ottoman Turks, had to transfer control to Britain through the Clemenceau Lloyd George Agreement in 1918 (Reddy, 2020). The occupation of the British Anglican Christian Kingdom, which was followed by the migration of European Jewish groups to Palestine, continued with the establishment of the state of Israel on Palestinian land on May 14, 1948 (Bar, 2022). The dynamics of the Palestinian occupation have at least given rise to the epicenter of global terrorism and jihadist ideological networks.

The failure of several Muslim rulers to defend their territory from the Western World has become the driving force for the birth of several civil society political movements based on theological solidarity. Hasan Al-Banna, together with Sayyid Qutb, for example, founded the Muslim Brotherhood (IM) in Egypt in April 1928. The IM was founded to carry out cultural and religious politics in response to the aftermath of the British occupation of Egypt in 1922. Several countries neighboring Egypt were still colonial colonies, contested between England, France, and Italy under the pretext of a League of Nations mandate (Hasan, 2020).

The construction of a resistance identity emerged among some Muslim circles to fight against colonial power holders. The resistance movement builds a specific collective identity, supported by psychological similarities as a threatened entity. The existence of feelings about a common enemy within IM, for example, was encouraged by ideologue Sayyid Qutb, who suggested armed resistance (Anwar, 2023). On 29 August 1966, Qutb was sentenced to death by the Egyptian government, which had an impact on the transformation of jihadist ideology into a variant of the movement. At least three central figures continued Qutb's ideology (Khamdan, 2017). First, Syukri Musthofa formed a jihadist faction within IM called Jamaah Al Muslimin, known as Jamaah Takfir wal Hijrah. Second, Ismail At-Thanthawi founded Jamaah Jihad or Tanzimul Jihad in 1970 and continued by Ayman Az-Zawahiri in 1993. Third, Umar Abdurrahman founded Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah in 1973 (Musallam, 2020). The global ideology of jihad is developing that the application of Allah's law is a necessity so that governments that are infidel or not based on Allah's law must be replaced or fought.

Table 1. Resistance in Muslim Majority Countries

No	Country	Years	Response and Resistance
1	Palestina vs Israel	1948	The establishment of Hizbut Tahrir in 1953, the establishment of Hezbollah in Lebanon in 1985, and the establishment of

			Harakat Al-Muqawwamatul Islamiyah (HAMAS) in 1987 resulted in the First Intifada
2	Afghanistan vs. Uni Soviet	1979	The Afghan Mujahideen are in 2 alliances: the Sunni alliance (Peshawar Seven) and the Shia alliance (Tehran Eight). Al-Qaeda was founded by Osama bin Laden, Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, and Aiman Az-Zawahiri in 1988.
3	Bosnia vs Serbia	1992	Genocide of around 8 thousand Bosnian Muslims by the Serbian military in Srebrenica, triggering the post-Afghan mujahideen alliance to Bosnia
4	Asia Tenggara vs Militer Negara	1993	Discrimination against Muslim minorities in the Southeast Asia region influenced the founding of Jemaah Islamiyah. Several Muslim minorities include Patani Muslims in Thailand, Moro Muslims in the Philippines, Malay Muslims in Singapore, and Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar.

Theological solidarity with Muslims who were colonized by infidels in some areas was strengthened by the traumatic feeling of the Palestinian war with Israel. Theological solidarity encourages a spirit of resistance to reduce Western dominance and the invasion of infidel governments. This reality has given rise to the development of violent extremism in the world. The momentum for strengthening the global jihad network was at least driven by several events, such as the Soviet Union's military invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the attempt to exterminate the Bosnian Muslim ethnic group by Serbia in 1992, the war over territory between the Indian Hindu government and Pakistani Muslims in Kashmir, and the United States military invasion of Iraq post-WTC bombing in New York on September 11, 2001.

3.3. Retaliatory Action Against the United States and the Coalition Countries

The United States declared war on terrorism after the 9/11 WTC bombings. Ironically, the narrative of the war on terrorism is intended to invade Muslim-populated countries that previously dared to oppose US interests. We carried out the military invasion of Afghanistan on the orders of George W. Bush on October 7, 2001. The military occupation operation had the pretext of attacking the Al-Qaeda organization and the Afghan Taliban government because they were considered the actors in the WTC bombing and several vital United States objects (Beaud, 2023). The US accusation is based on an Al-Qaeda fatwa in 1998 that called for killing Americans and their allies in retaliation for crimes against Muslims.

The Al-Qaeda fatwa, as a statement of jihad against Jews and Crusaders, was signed by Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda, along with four other mujahideen alliance figures on 23 February 1998 (Buciu, 2021). The four mujahideen alliances consist of Ayman Al Zawahiri representing the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Abu Yasir Rifai Ahmad Taha representing the Egyptian Al-Jami'ah Al-Islamiyah, Syaikh Mir Hamzah representing the Pakistani Jami'atul Ulama, and Fazlur Rahman representing the Bangladeshi Islamic Jihad Harakatul. The 1998 mujahideen alliance fatwa was at least obeyed by some of the mujahideen networks belonging to Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia.

The US military invasion of Afghanistan, which was considered a unilateralist action or a one-sided policy without respecting the rules of international law, gave rise to acts of revenge globally. The embryo of revenge by some members of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) against the US and its allies was marked by the Bali Bomb I, which killed 202 people from 22 countries. Each of them is Australia with 88 people, Indonesia with 38 people, England with 23 people, United States with 7 people, Germany with 6 people, Sweden with 5 people, France and the Netherlands with 4 people each, Denmark and Switzerland each 3 people, Brazil, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa and South Korea 2 people each, and Ecuador, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Taiwan 1 person each.

Figure 1. The network structure of Jamaah Islamiyah Southeast Asia

After the first Bali Bombing, activism in the war against terrorism led by the US and supported by NATO member countries seemed to be justified. Indonesian security forces uncovered the case by releasing three sketches of the perpetrator's face on October 30, 2002. One of the main suspects, Amrozi bin Nur Hasyim, was arrested in Tenggulun village, Lamongan, East Java, on November 5, 2002. A day later, 10 other suspects were arrested simultaneously from several regions based on a relationship of mutual assistance in planning and executing blasts. Successively, the core explosives team was arrested. Namely, Imam Samudra was caught on 17 November 2002 in Banten, while Mukhlas alias Ali Ghufron, who was Amrozi's older brother, was caught along with his younger brother, Ali Imron, on 3 December 2002 in Klaten. The death penalty was handed down to Amrozi, Imam Samudera, and Mukhlas in October 2003.

The target of revenge against the US and assets belonging to its citizens is still the primary motive for the JI network's terror acts. The bomb terror was repeated in Bali on October 1, 2005, with the explosion of RAJA's Bar in Kuta and Nyoman Café in Jimbaran, which killed 22 people and injured around 102 people. A month later, Anti-Terror Densus 88 succeeded in arresting Dr. Azhari during the siege in Batu, Malang, on November 9, 2005. The siege carried

out by the National Police's Black Swallow Crisis Response Team (CRT), numbering 12 people, resulted in Dr. Azhari dying.

Noordin M. Top continued the leadership of the JI terror network cell. Efforts for revenge were carried out by targeting two hotels in Jakarta that were part of the United States hotel chain: the JW Marriot Hotel and the Ritz Carlton Hotel. The terrorist bombing of the two hotels occurred on July 17, 2009, or nine days after the 2009 presidential election voting. The suicide bombing of two hotels in the Mega Kuningan area of South Jakarta killed 9 people and injured 53 people. The enforcement processes carried out by Densus 88 resulted in the death of Noordin M Top in a raid on 17 September 2009 in Mojosongo, Solo. The success of the Indonesian security forces in arresting Dr. Azhari and Noordin M Top influenced the transformation of the direction of the terror movement aimed at attacking government officials.

3.4. Retaliatory Action Against Indonesian Security Forces

The terror network cells, which were disintegrated due to the loss of command, were mobilized by Dulmatin in the spirit of revenge on the security forces. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who holds the position of Amir JI, always refuses recognition because he founded and led Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT). The mobilization of terrorist cells is at least a kind of reunion of Afghan mujahideen alumni in military training in Bukit Janto, Aceh, since mid-2009. This cross-group para-military training or Tanzim involves involvement with a bomb assembly expert and JI training field commander named Umar Patek, Abu Tholut, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, and Abdullah Sunata.

Dulmatin succeeded in uniting many militias through training in Aceh. Therefore, there was an effort to establish Tanzim Al-Qaeda Serambi Makkah to give the impression that the cross-Tanzim group was on the same level as Al-Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden (Fitriani, 2018). Several militias include JI, JAT, the Dulmatin network, the Banten group as the West Java Darul Islam faction, the DI faction commanded by Enceng Kurnia, the former NII, the KOMPAK mujahideen part of the DI Sulawesi faction, the Lampung mujahideen and other mujahideen factions. The merging of terror network cells posed a grave threat until the authorities finally revealed it on February 22, 2010.

Dulmatin's greatness and danger in being able to mobilize the mujahideen network and Umar Patek's field command skills were recognized by several countries. The US created a competition by promising a reward of 10 million US dollars for those who captured or provided important information for Dulmatin's arrest. The competition related to Umar Patek was awarded a prize of 1 million US dollars related to his arrest or providing information to arrest him. Dulmatin was killed by Densus 88 AT in an ambush at an internet cafe on March 9, 2010, in Pamulang, South Tangerang. The success of the National Police in arresting Dulmatin at least influenced Umar Patek to leave Indonesia via the Philippines and go to Pakistan. On January 25, 2011, Umar Patek was captured alive in Abbottabad, Pakistan, on January 25, 2011, and returned to Indonesia. In the same city, Osama bin Laden was captured by US troops on May 2, 2011 (Ali, 2023).

The siege of paramilitary terrorist training in Aceh, the death of Dulmatin, and the capture of Umar Patek resulted in terrorist networks in Indonesia increasingly being scattered into small cells. Network cells in western Indonesia, such as Lampung, Banten, Jabodetabek, and West Java, founded Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (MIB) led by Abu Roban. Meanwhile, a network cell in eastern Indonesia founded the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) led by Santoso in 2012. The main target of the post-Dulmatin terror generation turned into small terror attacks on security forces or civil society who interacted with the police.

Table 2. Description of Terror Against Security Forces Post Dulmatin

No	Time	Teror Act
1	15-17 March 2011	Book bombs to Gories Mere at the BNN office, Yapto Suryosumarno in Ciganjur, South Jakarta, Ulil Abshar Abdalla at KBR 68 H Utan Kayu, and Ahmad Dhani in Pondok Indah, South Jakarta

2	15 April 2011	Bombs at the Cirebon Police Headquarters Mosque during Friday Prayers
3	19 August 2012	A grenade bomb exploded at the Police Post at the Gladak Roundabout, Solo
4	20 December 2012	Berimob attack in Kalora, Poso
5	9 June 2013	Bombs at Poso Police Headquarters Mosque Poso
6	14 January 2016	Bombs and gunfire on MH Thamrin Street, Central Jakarta
7	5 July 2016	Bombs at Surakarta Police Headquarters
8	27 February 2017	Pan bombs at Cicendo Pandawa Park, Bandung
9	24 May 2017	Pan bombs at Transjakarta bus stop and Kampung Melayu terminal, East Jakarta during torch relay to welcome Ramadhan
10	8-10 May 2018	Riot at Mako Brimob Depok Detention Center
11	13-14 May 2018	Bombs at Surabaya Police Headquarters, 3 churches in Surabaya, Rusunawa Wonocolo Sidoarjo
12	16 May 2018	Attack on the Riau Police Headquarters by 4 terrorists wearing samurai
13	13 November 2019	Bombs at Medan Police Station
14	1 June 2020	Attack on Daha Selatan Police, South Kalimantan
15	31 March 2021	Attack on Loice Headquarters

MIB was able to be paralyzed more quickly by the police with the death of Abu Roban in an ambush in Batang, Central Java, on 8 May 2013. MIT took longer to deal with it because there were internal network factions, even though, in 2012, they appointed Santoso as Amir. The UN Security Council under the Al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee declared MIT a terrorist organization on September 29, 2015. The Santoso-Basri faction was successfully crushed on July 18, 2016, with the death of Santoso and his members in the Tambarana Mountains, Poso Pesisir Utara. Another MIT faction led by Ali Kalora, which was more frequently involved in firefights with security forces, was crushed in September 2022.

3.5. Religious Moderation and Ethics of Concern

The handling of terrorism from 2002 until the end of the MIT network led by Santoso in Poso did not reduce the potential threat of terrorism in Indonesia. Deradicalization efforts in and outside prisons require synergy from all groups and several resources. The weakness in implementing the 2003 Terrorism Law, for example, is that it has not adapted to new types of crimes that continue to develop. Cybercrime, for example, makes criminal law seem to lag behind or not yet accommodate new crime phenomena. In acts of terrorism, the involvement of children and women is a leap case that is not yet regulated in the Terrorism Law. The shift in the terrorist movement involving children and women demands the importance of considering the ethics of care, namely responsiveness, to pay attention to the impact of losing connection with oneself or with others.

The psychopolitics of society, which is related to the phenomenon of crime and legal regulations, focuses on protecting the human rights of citizens. Therefore, the challenge regarding the effectiveness of the Terrorism Law regulations will be measured based on humanitarian indicators in strategies for preventing and handling criminal terrorism. The revision of the Terrorism Law aims not only to eradicate terrorism but also concerns prevention, response, recovery of victims, responsible institutional apparatus, and monitoring mechanisms. Such demands emerged as a reaction from the civil society coalition, which saw that the actions of the security forces tended to display violent tendencies. In this position, carrying out peacebuilding strategies as part of religious moderation steps becomes important.

Peacebuilding as a conflict management strategy emphasizes the involvement of all parties in collaborative steps. Conflict is natural to humans, so it can end destructively or constructively. The two conditions for the end of a

conflict depend on internal group mechanisms, intergroup mechanisms, and external group mechanisms. The emergence or development and decline until the cessation of acts of terrorism are greatly influenced by the perspective and expression of people's behavior in responding to social problems in the surrounding environment.

The encounter of several group identities and social interactions that arise from a pluralistic society certainly has the potential to give rise to culture shock and culture lag. The shock of some groups influenced by differences in values will increasingly turn into open conflict if they are accompanied by thinking behind the times. Everyone in their social behavior often wishes not to be separated from religious motivation. In the context of stopping acts of terrorism, religion must be used as a prerequisite for achieving balance in society.

In the handling of acts of terror in Indonesia, there is at least a very clear difference between before and after the 2003 Terrorism Law. Before the Terrorism Law, all the perpetrators of the 2002 Bali Bombing could be captured alive with sufficient evidence and confessions or defenses in court. This is different from the handling after the Terrorism Law was implemented; raids were often broadcast live by the mass media and ended with the suspected terrorist being captured dead. Enforcement steps often result in shooting dead suspected terrorists outside of a court decision (extrajudicial killing) or wrongly arresting them with torture (Susila, 2021).

Civil society synergy encourages strengthening cross-agency cooperation in the prevention or de-radicalization process. Prevention that focuses on overcoming the roots of the growth of violent extremism is carried out simultaneously by elements of civil society. The coaching model outside the prison with a civil society approach is an effective step to accelerate the process of resocialization of former terrorism convicts and immunity from violence for society. A space for good social interaction must be built by all components of civil society because government programs often raise suspicion.

The target objects that civil society coalitions must work on can be categorized into 3 main clusters. First, the general public is based on the community, the professional ecosystem, and the living environment. Second, formal and non-formal educational institutions carry out counter-radicalization as well as build immunity to thinking that leads to violent extremism. Third, former terrorism convicts and network cells in society. The post-prison program, which the government has not officially prepared, is an opportunity for civil society coalitions to play a bigger role.

Several civil society organizations often work together in community advocacy on the issue of violent extremism. One consortium was formed by the Civil Society Against Violent Extremism (C-Save), established on June 5, 2017, to advocate for the Terrorism Bill. The consortium consists of The Habibie Center (THC), the Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (ICJR), the Indonesian Muslim Crisis Center (IMC2), the Institute for Community Studies and Advocacy (Elsam), the Islamic Learning Community, Peace Prasasti Foundation, Center for Radicalism and Deradicalization Studies, Asian Muslim Action Network Indonesia (AMAN Indonesia), and Search for Common Ground.

Since the 2018 Terrorism Law was introduced, the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) has formed a Terrorism Prevention Coordination Forum (FKPT) from provinces and cities in Indonesia. The civil society coalition in the form of FKPT was formed based on the mandate of BNPT Regulation Number 1 of 2022 concerning FKPT. This forum is dedicated as a partner in strategies for preventing terrorism in the region. Efforts to prevent acts of terrorism can be formulated into three strategies, namely national preparedness, counter-deradicalization, and de-radicalization.

Preparedness is intended as a government effort to carry out prevention through broad public education, increasing the capacity of state officials, developing facilities and infrastructure, increasing the capacity of terrorism study institutions, and mapping areas prone to radical terrorism as risk mitigation measures. This series of activities is an early detection effort by the government to anticipate the threat of terrorism appropriately and effectively. National preparedness mandates comprehensive action involving all government resources and elements of society.

Counter-radicalization is focused on dealing with people or communities who are vulnerable to exposure to violent extremism. Several activities can be carried out by the government directly or with community participation,

namely risk identification or assessment, intensive monitoring of terrorist networks, investigation of criminal acts of terrorism, monitoring the flow of funding for acts of terrorism, media literacy to counter the issue of radicalization, monitoring facilities and infrastructure for planned terror acts, and fostering peace ambassadors. Counter-radicalization intellectual strategies must be balanced with empathy and concern for building social cohesion.

The government and civil society coalition can go through several stages in the deradicalization strategy. First, identification or assessment to describe the level of exposure to or involvement in terrorist group cells and networks and identify a person's level of radical terrorism. Second, rehabilitation is a form of recovery or healing that reduces a person's radical level. Third, re-education is intended as a step in counseling or providing understanding to someone so that they can reduce or abandon their understanding of radicalism, which leads to terrorism. Fourth, social reintegration through a series of activities to facilitate people who are considered to have been exposed to radicalism to be accepted by their families and integrate into society.

Deradicalization of terrorist convicts and terrorist network cells is considered successful with several characteristics of success. This is at least characterized by a willingness to accept financial and other assistance, provide information, exchange opinions and awareness, pledge allegiance, and recognize Pancasila as the basis of the state (Khamdan, 2015). Several names, such as Ali Imron, who was the perpetrator of the first Bali Bombing and the younger brother of two death row inmates Amrozi and Mukhlis; Muhammad Rais, who was the perpetrator of the 2003 Marriot Bombing; Mubarak, Purnama Putra, and Idris are images of terrorist convicts and network cells who want to take part in the deradicalization program.

Several Afghan mujahideen alumni can be considered as one of the factors in the success of deradicalization in Indonesia. This reality is characterized by a willingness to accept business assistance or other forms of assistance from the government, to open independent business ventures, and to trade businesses according to regional characteristics and business skills. For example, Muhammad Rais, Idris, and Usman Syahid received parole (PB) and could live their lives like ordinary citizens. Idris alias Gembrot, who was one of the architects of the JW Marriot Hotel bombing, opened a transportation and car rental business in Bogor. Muhammad Rais opened a cellphone-buying and selling business in Pekanbaru. At the same time, Ali Fauzi Manzi, the younger brother of the Bali Bomb I trio, could continue his studies up to the doctoral level with the dissertation title "Religious Moderation for Ex-Convicts."

4. Conclusion

The success of the National Police through Densus 88 in solving several terrorism cases using various modes and changing patterns has received appreciation from various parties. The effectiveness of disclosing the perpetrators in the bomb terror series, for example, is supported by cooperative information from the community itself. In the case of the Bali Bomb I, for example, the disclosure of the parties involved was supported by the confessions of JI members other than Mantiqi I members. The problem arose when the Terrorism Law was passed, which gave full authority to the police to carry out the handling. Several arrests and ambushes tend to be accompanied by wrongful arrests, assaults, and shooting deaths. The celebration of violence carried out by Densus 88 did not have a deterrent effect but instead aroused feelings of revenge and a loss of sympathy among some people towards Densus 88.

The transformation of the terrorist movement, which initially targeted the government and citizens of the US and coalition countries, turned into revenge against Indonesian government officials. The terror carried out by the remaining network cells becomes less quality despite increasing quantity. The arrests carried out by the authorities against military training alumni of the Poso terrorist network and the South Sulawesi DI network, for example, have become a fairly long series of retaliations because they only end in 2022. The authorities' firm actions have a huge influence in minimizing vigilante action or the use of other methods. -violent methods of radical Islamic organization troops. However, civil society synergy has an important role to play in creating immunity from violent extremist ideologies.

As part of the official BNPT program, the deradicalization program can be effectively implemented systematically with the involvement of civil society in stages and based on residential areas. It is not yet clear how the structured program design will be carried out on an ongoing basis, but it is still based on the initiative of each civil society group. Preventive measures to reduce the potential for terror to occur in the name of religion or other interests must be carried out continuously and in an integrated manner. All agencies, community leaders, community organizations, and security forces must aggressively carry out early detection through well-structured risk mitigation.

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